I also discuss how seeming infinite preferences against suffering could lead to a negative-leaning utilitarian perspective. It's a classic debate among utilitarians: should we care about an organism's happiness and suffering (hedonic wellbeing), or should we ultimately value fulfilling what it wants, whatever that may be (preferences)? In this piece, I discuss intuitions on both sides and explore a hybrid view that gives greater weight to the hedonic subsystems of brains than to other overriding subsystems. Postscript: Dialogue on non-hedonic preferencesīased on a piece from 2006 major additions: Oct.Is creating new satisfied preferences good?.What if neural subsystems strongly disagree with the final stated preference?. ![]() How do we compare utility within an organism over time?.How do we compare utility across organisms?.Other remaining questions for preference utilitarianism.Idealized preferences and agent-moments.Hedonic happiness, preference-based suffering.Is any sufficiently advanced intelligent agent conscious?.Hedonic experience as the id’s preferences?.Preference utilitarianism is more constrained.Infinite preferences and negative-leaning utilitarianism.Libertarian intuitions for preference utilitarianism.Preference utilitarianism as a universal morality.Cases where preferences diverge from hedonic wellbeing.
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